Интересный очерк
Sep. 12th, 2011 04:50 pmЭгалитаризм
«One reason I am optimistic about the prospects for democracy here is the instantly apparent egalitarianism. Deference is paid to age, but otherwise Libyans are without the obsequiousness to rank and status that I’ve seen so often in Afghanistan. The fact that education through university has been free since independence [1951] is part of the explanation. People from humble backgrounds have become doctors, scientists, engineers, lawyers.
Amina Megheirbi, a English professor here whose grandparents were illiterate, explained to me that there are no VIPs in Libya. The reason is that Qaddafi and his family were the only game in town. But the legacy of this ugly situation is an unusually level playing field. Yesterday, two 50-something Libyan women from well-off families mentioned to me that their maids (now vanished along with most foreign guest-workers) would watch TV with the family. They knew from visits to Egypt that this is not the case in most developing countries.
....
Another factor is Libya’s conservative culture, which is more of a double-edged sword. Qaddafi’s destruction of the fledgling political institutions Libya had when he seized power in 1969 threw Libyans back on older ties of family and tribe. No, tribalism isn’t good. But Libya’s social cohesion kept all but a tiny number of Libyans from looting when the Qaddafi regime collapsed in the east. This is still a shame society, urbanized though it is.»
Мания "революционных комитетов"
«There is also a way in which this revolution is an equal and opposite reaction to Qaddafi’s 1969 coup. Qaddafi’s peculiar Green Book advocated direct democracy, and in the Seventies he tried to mobilize Libyan society through a series of committees. Of course, power was in the hands of a few. As Qaddafi’s regime grew darker and more violent, the only committees that mattered were the “revolutionary committees,” the lijan thureah, that had virtually unlimited power.
So, the first thing that the citizens of Benghazi did with their new freedom was to organize themselves into committees with the opposite agenda—to build civil society and heal the wounds of the war.
Amal el Gehani, a 25-year old lecturer in electrical engineering, explained in English honed at the University of Manchester that she belongs to three. “One is for rescuing families injured by war. The second is Shabab Libya Hurra. I am with the media committee where we do radio shows on Libyan radio. The third is the Feb 17 Youth, a committee for organizing other committees.” She added that after Qaddafi goes and society returns to normal, she will happily return to teaching: “This is very hard.”»
«One reason I am optimistic about the prospects for democracy here is the instantly apparent egalitarianism. Deference is paid to age, but otherwise Libyans are without the obsequiousness to rank and status that I’ve seen so often in Afghanistan. The fact that education through university has been free since independence [1951] is part of the explanation. People from humble backgrounds have become doctors, scientists, engineers, lawyers.
Amina Megheirbi, a English professor here whose grandparents were illiterate, explained to me that there are no VIPs in Libya. The reason is that Qaddafi and his family were the only game in town. But the legacy of this ugly situation is an unusually level playing field. Yesterday, two 50-something Libyan women from well-off families mentioned to me that their maids (now vanished along with most foreign guest-workers) would watch TV with the family. They knew from visits to Egypt that this is not the case in most developing countries.
....
Another factor is Libya’s conservative culture, which is more of a double-edged sword. Qaddafi’s destruction of the fledgling political institutions Libya had when he seized power in 1969 threw Libyans back on older ties of family and tribe. No, tribalism isn’t good. But Libya’s social cohesion kept all but a tiny number of Libyans from looting when the Qaddafi regime collapsed in the east. This is still a shame society, urbanized though it is.»
Мания "революционных комитетов"
«There is also a way in which this revolution is an equal and opposite reaction to Qaddafi’s 1969 coup. Qaddafi’s peculiar Green Book advocated direct democracy, and in the Seventies he tried to mobilize Libyan society through a series of committees. Of course, power was in the hands of a few. As Qaddafi’s regime grew darker and more violent, the only committees that mattered were the “revolutionary committees,” the lijan thureah, that had virtually unlimited power.
So, the first thing that the citizens of Benghazi did with their new freedom was to organize themselves into committees with the opposite agenda—to build civil society and heal the wounds of the war.
Amal el Gehani, a 25-year old lecturer in electrical engineering, explained in English honed at the University of Manchester that she belongs to three. “One is for rescuing families injured by war. The second is Shabab Libya Hurra. I am with the media committee where we do radio shows on Libyan radio. The third is the Feb 17 Youth, a committee for organizing other committees.” She added that after Qaddafi goes and society returns to normal, she will happily return to teaching: “This is very hard.”»