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a_kleberНаграбленное в jstor-e. Рецензия от советолога Hillel Ticktin'а, где излагаются его собственные взгляды (как это часто бывает, в виде критики рецензируемой книги). Про самого Тиктина можно узнать здесь и здесь.
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Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, L19.99.
ARCHIE BROWN IS VERY WELL KNOWN WITHIN SOVIET/RUSSIAN STUDIES for his articles and media interviews on Gorbachev and Russia. Now he has written his long awaited book on Gorbachev. It is in part a kind of memoir in that he tells us that he spoke, interviewed and discussed with many of the critical Soviet personalities of the period. He also notes his own role in advising the British Foreign office and Margaret Thatcher to support Gorbachev. The book provides a graphic description of the way that Gorbachev reached power, consolidated it and lost it. It is well written and might well deserve a prize in its class.
The Great Man theory of history
It is an openly partisan book, though not uncritical. Nor is there anything wrong with being openly partisan. Brown tells us that he predicted Gorbachev's rise. Gorbachev brought the system in the Soviet Union to an end by peaceful means, we are told, which is no mean achievement, however one looks at it. We are left with the feeling that one man can play an absolutely critical role in world history and hence we ought once again to be looking at great men in order to understand history.
It is true that Brown tells us that he is not oblivious to socio-economic changes or to the changing consciousness of the working class (p. 12). Given that one of his supervisees published an article precisely on the increasing number of strikes in the Soviet Union in the early to mid 1970s, it would have been surprising if he were not aware of the role of the workers (M. Holubenko (Bohdan Krawchenko), 'The Soviet Working Class', Critique 4, 1975, pp. 5-25). We are told that this book concentrates only on Gorbachev as a factor in the ending of the Soviet Union, so, for its purpose, ignoring the other factors, we are to assume.
There is no methodological discussion in this book, so we are left to deduce Brown's philosophy of history, as placing great stress on the one man theory of history. Again, there is nothing wrong with such a viewpoint or rather the more limited form of it, which one must assume that Brown takes. I can, personally, agree that at certain crucial points of world history one man can play an enormous role in facilitating progress, retarding it or simply supporting stasis. Of course, this requires a necessarily value-laden definition of progress but one could substitute the words 'historical movement' for progress to make it more neutral. Those who only see accident in history usually develop amnesia when they look at the Soviet Union, since it so obviously came into being, developed, declined and passed away. Hence Brown's subject is legitimate and he has brought a wealth of evidence to it. The list of people whom he interviewed or consulted is very impressive. It includes most of the influential reformers. There can be no question but that the wealth of detail in the work helps to provide a very useful history of the period. Nor can we doubt the originality of Brown's work for he has written an almost painstaking account of Gorbachev's steps to reform.
Nonetheless, I am left with the uncomfortable feeling that Brown does see Gorbachev as the great man at an important node of world history. I am uncomfortable because I cannot see that Gorbachev was either a great man or even a prime mover in the events during his reign. Brown [318] lays great stress on Gorbachev's ability to change his views and change others' views and hence sees Gorbachev as the source of change. I doubt whether there was any change of ideas taking place, except in name, or whether ideas played much of a role in the changing of the USSR.
Gorbachev's rise to power
Brown's almost touching early life story for Gorbachev is too official to provide the full picture. While all the events he describes are no doubt accurate, they are not enough to explain Gorbachev's rise and rise to power. He portrays a hard-working, intelligent, well-read and bright man who observed reality and wanted to bring policy in line with that reality. He even indicates that the KGB investigated Gorbachev's friendship with Mlynar, the Czech reformer, but they obviously found nothing against him (p. 41). That in itself is strange because the friendship in itself would be known to the secret police and they would have drawn the correct conclusions. Gorbachev meanwhile acquired all the friends in high places he needed simply by being party secretary in Stavropol. Even Andropov is linked to Stavropol. So Gorbachev became a member of the Politburo in due course because he had the luck to be in Stavropol. As a story it is worthy of a Hollywood film but it does not ring true. When Gromyko spoke of Gorbachev's iron teeth, in his congratulatory speech on Gorbachev's accession to the General Secretaryship, he was not making it up. No one reached the highest office in the Soviet Union without two conditions. The first was institutional backing and the second was suitably ruthless personal qualities. Indeed, he showed how ruthless he could be when he dismissed swathes of the old party apparatus when he established himself. Yesterday's men were put on trial for corruption. He could not have behaved differently in his rise to power.
The government of the USSR had three wings: the apparatus of the party, the apparatus of the secret police, and the general staff of the army. Historically rulers needed at least two of these forces to reach and retain power.
When Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary in March 1985 the party apparatus was divided. That was made clear by their earlier nomination of Chernenko instead of Gorbachev, against the wishes of Andropov, as Brown details very well. Various events after March 1985 indicated that he was on probation. Why then did Gorbachev proceed to reforms so easily? The answer lies in the strength of his support both politically and socially. Not only did the KGB back Gorbachev but major sections of the elite supported him. In other words, Gorbachev had the state support needed to govern but more importantly he also had most of the elite with him. He was backed by the administrative elite but even sections of the historically Stalinist elite went over to him.
The reason for his relative strength lay in the decline of the Stalinist system and the alternatives confronting the 6elite. One modern Russian intellectual put it this way: 'The real reason for perestroika 10 years ago was to preserve a system that was breaking down on its own', says Yevgueni Nemets. 'Since then there have really been two layers of change-official change, which has mostly been geared toward preserving the old power centres, and the spontaneous changes that are the result of the old system breaking down and haphazard reforms' ('Russians Raise Their Expectations', Wall St Journal, 9 July 1996).
A system in decline
The point is that the system was in dire straits. The economy was in irrevocable decline. The historical sources of labour had dried up. That meant two things. One was that there were not enough workers coming on stream to man the plants. The second was that the numerous [319] technological and reliability problems could not be solved, however temporarily, with the use of labour. The system was, effectively, in its death throes and the elite knew it. More importantly, the intelligentsia and the working class also knew it, even if they did not express it either clearly or with self-confidence. The results were plain to see for all those with eyes to see.
The intelligentsia had shifted further to the right, moving over to religion, drugs and von Hayek. Sakharov had supported Pinochet 10 years earlier and his view of Pinochet became a more general view of sections of the elite, ultimately culminating in Lebed's well known 1996 election statement that Russia needed a Pinochet. By this time, however, the intelligentsia had found new heroes. The workers were beginning to strike and they could no longer be shot down in the old way.
The market supplanted communism as a heroic goal to which all could aspire. It was a utopia where everyone who worked hard could be as rich as Rockefeller. The workers had no use for the classical market but they too bought the idea that they could control their own product, as well as their own labour process, in an ideal market. That all social groups disliked the social system was axiomatic but that all social groups agreed on one goal, understood totally differently, it is true, the market, was historic. It meant that there was a window of opportunity for the ruling elite, which, if taken, would allow them to shift from one social system to another, without losing their social position.
Brown does not agree that the people were discontented with the system, as opposed to having grievances. It is true that the working class and peasantry were and still are opposed to capitalism. That, however, does not mean and did not mean that people could not distinguish between Stalinism, a term he also uses at one point, and socialism. In other words, the discontent was systemic rather than simply grumbles. Brown sees Gorbachev as correctly diagnosing the problem and providing the correct long-term solution-the social market, in a democratic framework but all from above.
The KGB, as the eyes and ears of the elite, were more aware than anyone of the problems and opportunities presented by the time. They knew the extent and forms of discontent. Indeed, by being incorporated so directly into ruling the society, they became the society and so were subject to similar pressures. As the direct instrument of atomisation, they were in a position to decide whether repression was preferable to more radical measures. In fact, they backed reform first with Andropov and then later with Gorbachev. Brown describes in considerable detail the way in which Ligachev, the critical Stalinist, was instrumental in supporting Gorbachev but puts this down to Gorbachev's earlier friendship with and promotion of the man. The later alliance between Chebrikov, the head of the KGB, and Ligachev, however, was no accident. I wonder whether this tremendous stress on Gorbachev's personal relations can bear the weight placed on it by Brown.
In contrast to my view outlined above, Brown leaves us feeling that Gorbachev single- handedly outwitted the old 'Marxist-Leninists'. Admittedly he cites people testifying to Gorbachev's diligence, erudition and almost brilliance but these qualities could never be enough to defeat the entire apparatus. We are told, however, how even the general secretary's house was bugged, which could only mean that most of the men of government and the ruling elite in general knew what was to come. They did not know the end result and the break-up of the USSR was not foreordained, particularly because the elite itself was divided. In short Gorbachev was an instrument rather than the source of change.
The KGB has numerous references in the index but none of them deal in detail with its role in the Soviet Union. As Andropov designated Gorbachev as his successor and as Andropov was the former head of the KGB and retained its support, it is hard not to come to the conclusion that Gorbachev was the KGB candidate for the General Secretaryship. Yet Brown gives the KGB almost no political role to play. [320]
Indeed one might almost think that there was no social group ruling the society, no privileged social group outside the party apparatus. Instead there were simply a series of economists, politicians and members of the intelligentsia. Some politicians wanted change and others did not. Those that did not were backward and possibly evil men.
Was Gorbachev so stupid that he did not understand the course on which he was set? Brown quotes Shakhnazarov to the effect that Gorbachev was determined to carry out a radical change of the society to its final conclusion and we are told that Gorbachev was a social democrat (p. 102). It is not at all clear what a social democratic programme would look like in any country, let alone Russia. From one quote we are given to understand that Gorbachev wanted a welfare state form of capitalism. As the welfare state and social democracy were in crisis everywhere, this makes Gorbachev rather ill-informed and possibly naive. Furthermore, the effect of a shift to the market could only be one in which unemployment would rise, disparities in income and wealth would worsen and groups such as pensioners, the intelligentsia and women would be worse off. A glance at the West would show that this would be the likely result. In fact, this is what has occurred but it was blindingly obvious to those not already blind.
Marxism-Leninism, new ideas and old ideas
Brown has a different view. He cites three ways of looking at Gorbachev-as someone who learned as he went along; as someone who did not know what he was doing and hence operated under the pressure of events and social groups; and as someone who was able to act more profoundly as he acquired more power (p. 13). Brown makes it clear that he regards the first and last explanations of Gorbachev as correct. The problem with this explanation and indeed with the whole book is that there is an enormous stress on a change in ideas. Gorbachev was different, according to Brown, because he had a 'remarkably open mind' (ibid) and hence could adapt over time. In other words, Ligachev and his predecessors were Marxist-Leninists who could not see reality, unlike Gorbachev.
This is a truly primitive approach, worthy perhaps of the secret services, but in no way realistic. Anyone who knew the old Soviet Union knew that there were no Marxists in the Communist Party. To be a genuine Marxist in the Soviet Union was to court imprisonment and worse. What then was a Marxist-Leninist in the Soviet Union? He was not a Marxist, and surely not a Leninist either, as Lenin remained dedicated to a world socialist revolution to the end of his days and such a revolution meant, for Lenin, the abolition of all forms of privilege. A Marxist-Leninist was then neither a Marxist nor a Leninist but a simple apologist for the status quo, with an occasional critical reference to Stalin's achievements, particularly in building socialism in one country. Indeed Brown comes close to this statement when he speaks of Marxism-Leninism as being those parts of the doctrines of Marx and Lenin which suited the purpose of the party hierarchy but with an added gloss (p. 96). Since very few individuals in the old Soviet Union were uncritical of the status quo we have to conclude that a Marxist- Leninist was simply an accomplished liar, who differed from Western liars in using a large number of quotations from some Marxist writers. The material basis of such people lay in their need to defend the existence of privilege or the so-called nomenklatura.
Gorbachev from this angle was an accomplished liar who knew when to stop lying. He could never have believed in Marxism, Leninism or for that matter socialism, as understood by Marx, Keir Hardie or Sydney Webb.(1) Brown, however, argues that Gorbachev was a Marxist, from the time that he was a student, and cites Mlynar to that effect (pp. 31-32, 119). A genuine Marxist is not distinguished by proclamations but by theoretical analysis and practical action. In those Soviet conditions, to be a Marxist would mean analysing the forms of exploitation and oppression and finding ways of opposing it, even if underground or very deep underground There is no trace in Gorbachev's writings or statements of any understanding of the concept [321] of exploitation. After all, Gorbachev never supported egalitarianism. He explicitly denounced it many times and obstructed the attempts to remove elite privileges in 1989-90. No doubt Brown is right in one respect; Gorbachev was a social democrat, strongly influenced by Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, and indeed still is one.(2) But it is hard to see that Gorbachev changed his viewpoint. He did not need to do so. Gorbachev wanted a form of so-called 'market-socialism and was surprised to discover that it did not work, in spite of his Soviet and Western advisers.
Brown's mechanism for change becomes one of ideological conversion. He argues that the KGB and army made non-evolutionary change remote (pp. 22, 56, 113), and hence we are led to conclude that Gorbachev was a prime instrument in this evolutionary change, complementary indeed to the dissidents like Sakharov (p. 56). Curiously, he points out quite correctly that the Communist Party was not a party but a state structure, to which many people belonged because it was necessary to do so as part of their career. As a result, it had many different viewpoints within it and many different factions from monarchist through nationalists and liberals to a few genuine socialists. Hence he argues, quite rightly, that its disintegration became inevitable once a measure of pluralism was established (p. 22).
The problem is that these different viewpoints had existed for a long time inside the Communist Party, even if their proponents dared not come out openly with their views. The Stalinised Communist Party had been nationalist from the 1920s. It had become increasingly anti-semitic from the 1920s onwards. The market had been resuscitated as a rational path for the Soviet Union first under Stalin, then under Khrushchev and most notably under Kosygin. The intelligentsia was divided between liberals and nationalists. The market, however, had wide support. One might even make the case that if not for the Czech developments in 1967-68, Kosygin might have pressed the timid market reforms, which had just begun, somewhat further. In other words, the ideological conditions for reforms existed for a long time. One could go even further and ask whether the market could not have been introduced by Stalin in 1925-27.
To give Brown some credit, he does mention that reforms were easier in the 1980s because of the relatively high level of education, access to limited information through the radio and TV, and decline in the rate of growth and life expectancy (p. 18). He then, however, lays particular stress on the growth of freedom of expression in private circles made possible when families had their own flats. There is no reference to the KGB or NKVD here. The result in my view exaggerates the freedom of expression possible in the old system and underplays the enormous role of the secret police and other instruments of atomisation in the whole period. Brown goes on to explain in the chapter on economic reform that Gorbachev had an easier time of introducing the reform because the economy was in patent decline, the political context was in his favour, it was the general secretary introducing the reform and he had public opinion in his favour (p. 134).
Brown and his critics
Brown, as mentioned above, advised Margaret Thatcher that Gorbachev was the man to support and wrote papers to that effect (pp. 77-78). This raises the intriguing question of who was promoting whom. Brown, adviser to Thatcher and so to the Conservative Party, supported Gorbachev, whose position was substantially strengthened within the Communist Party as a result. Who, however, advised Brown of Gorbachev's real views? That he wanted to go to the market appeared likely to me and indeed anyone who understood the system, without knowing Gorbachev, since the elite had wanted to do so for a very long time and Gorbachev was more dynamic and typical of the post-war elite. That, however, was not the way Brown derived his conclusion. His view was much more personal, more accurate and clearly derived from intimate discussions with important people within the USSR of the time. We may then speculate that [322] Gorbachev's people impressed on Brown the need to support Gorbachev from the point of view of Western governments. One gets the impression that Brown is arguing against critics to his right who felt that little could change in that system and that only the firm line taken by Reagan and Thatcher ensured that the system fell. Gorbachev from this point of view remained a Communist, as evidenced by his refusal to abandon the word 'socialism'. Such a view, and it is quite a popular view in some circles both in Russia and the West, cannot be seriously entertained. The system was in visible disintegration before Reagan came to the presidency. Brown's reply is different. He argues that the system was too strong to be overthrown and Gorbachev changed it from the inside. In this context, he did so by retaining the word socialism but so redefining it that it came to mean a liberal welfare state capitalist democracy (pp. 118-121).
The economy
He argues, almost as an aside, that the 'command economy' worked (even if inefficiently) as long as repression and the Communist Party and Soviet state retained power. Once these two pillars were removed, 'production fell, hoarding increased and shortages grew' (p. 131). Nothing could successfully exist between Stalinism and the market. Brown is really making two points. Firstly, the system could have gone on if not for Gorbachev's reforms. Secondly, once the reforms were initiated the system began to collapse. It is hard to disagree with the second point, especially as I made it many times myself at the time, but I added the rider that they would not make it to the market either, leaving them in a limbo, and so it has turned out.
When Brown talks of the economy, he speaks of its inefficiency as axiomatic. We have, therefore, no indication of the reasons for that inefficiency. It is assumed as an absolute that the market economy is efficient and hence the USSR was inefficient. While it is undoubtedly true that Stalinism is less efficient than capitalism, judged in terms of the cost and quality of output, that does not answer why it should be so. If the criterion were to be standard of living, then the workers of the Soviet Union clearly had a lower standard of living than any country in Western Europe and one might (and I would) attribute that lower standard of living to the Stalinist system. Nonetheless, an explanation of the failure is needed, which is more than just a statement of the inherent superiority of the market. After all, there are market economies, such as Saudi Arabia, India or Brazil, where the standard of living of much of the population is abysmal partly because of the wide income differentials, as well as other obvious reasons which cannot be discussed here.
Because he has no explicit reason for its inefficiency he can have no reason for its decline, which he refers to in a number of places, most obviously in the economic chapter (pp. 134- 136). In turn, this means that Brown cannot have an explanation for the failure to introduce the reform earlier and its difficulties under Gorbachev and later. His correct perception that there must be either one system or the other does not dispose of the problem.
There were and still are three crucial economic categories which require to be transformed The first is the transformation of the ruble into money. That required that ruble emission be very strictly limited, something not done until April 1995, with highly negative consequences, the budget be balanced and prices reflect costs in the short term and supply and demand in the long term. As these measures require the acceptance of widespread bankruptcy, mass unem- ployment and ever wider income differentials, it is not surprising that no government down to the present has been able to grasp the nettle and act. The second aspect which required change was the transformation of the typical very large Soviet enterprise into smaller competing units. The third was the removal of protection for Soviet enterprises against foreign competition. The end result of the implementation of these conditions for capitalism would be mass [323] unemployment if not mass starvation. The population has revolted against the limited aspects of the market introduced by 1996 by supporting the semi-fascist Communist Party of the Russian Federation or abstaining from supporting any candidate. Indeed El'tsin had to adapt to many of the anti-market demands made by his opposition in order to be reelected. Under these conditions it is not surprising that Gorbachev failed. He had no hope of succeeding. Gorbachev only got 0.5% of the total votes in the first round of the presidential election precisely because he had led the countries of the former USSR into an even worse economic mess than before. The problem, here, is that this result was entirely predictable.
Gorbachev was indecisive because there was no real solution for his dilemma, not because he was inherently indecisive. Brown points out that his replacement of personnel was anything but indecisive. Indeed El'tsin looks similarly indecisive today, moving over time from the monetarists to the protectionists and somewhere in the middle. From this perspective the situation was hopeless.
On the other hand, there is another perspective. The elite wanted to shift the system towards capitalism but realised the difficulty in doing so. Hence one faction preferred not to move for political reasons, and not because they were inherently obstructive. They understood the political consequences better than Gorbachev and feared them. On the other hand, there was another faction, which probably also understood the consequences but did not care as long as they could achieve certain limited results. The first of these was their own extemalisation, i.e. the export of assets under their own name, whether originally their own property or that of the society, abroad. The second was the establishment of title to assets internally, however limited, so establishing inheritance of property. This they have achieved. All factions needed to extend the life of the ruling group, as a ruling group, in order to preserve their own privileges and so control over the economy. Gorbachev served the purposes of all these groups until 1990.
We are left to make our own conclusion, a conclusion radically different from Brown's.
Gorbachev wanted capitalism but did not understand its modem operations and did not
understand its likely impact on Russia. On the other hand, the elite standing behind Gorbachev
knew what they were doing, and they achieved their object, but Gorbachev was cast aside
because he was out of his depth.
IREES, University of Glasgow
HILLEL H. TICKTIN
1) The term 'socialism' can mean anything today. In reality, though, the appeal of socialism lies in its egalitarianism and programme for workers' self-management of the society and its units.
2) Brown quotes Shakhnazarov to the effect that Gorbachev had told him in December 1989 that he was a social democrat (p. 102) and later discusses the influence of Willy Brandt and Felipe Gonzalez (pp. 116-117) and quotes him as saying that he wanted the German welfare state in 1993 (p. 138).
EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1997, 317-350
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И кстати посоветую удобную пдф-читалку: sumatrapdf
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Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, L19.99.
ARCHIE BROWN IS VERY WELL KNOWN WITHIN SOVIET/RUSSIAN STUDIES for his articles and media interviews on Gorbachev and Russia. Now he has written his long awaited book on Gorbachev. It is in part a kind of memoir in that he tells us that he spoke, interviewed and discussed with many of the critical Soviet personalities of the period. He also notes his own role in advising the British Foreign office and Margaret Thatcher to support Gorbachev. The book provides a graphic description of the way that Gorbachev reached power, consolidated it and lost it. It is well written and might well deserve a prize in its class.
The Great Man theory of history
It is an openly partisan book, though not uncritical. Nor is there anything wrong with being openly partisan. Brown tells us that he predicted Gorbachev's rise. Gorbachev brought the system in the Soviet Union to an end by peaceful means, we are told, which is no mean achievement, however one looks at it. We are left with the feeling that one man can play an absolutely critical role in world history and hence we ought once again to be looking at great men in order to understand history.
It is true that Brown tells us that he is not oblivious to socio-economic changes or to the changing consciousness of the working class (p. 12). Given that one of his supervisees published an article precisely on the increasing number of strikes in the Soviet Union in the early to mid 1970s, it would have been surprising if he were not aware of the role of the workers (M. Holubenko (Bohdan Krawchenko), 'The Soviet Working Class', Critique 4, 1975, pp. 5-25). We are told that this book concentrates only on Gorbachev as a factor in the ending of the Soviet Union, so, for its purpose, ignoring the other factors, we are to assume.
There is no methodological discussion in this book, so we are left to deduce Brown's philosophy of history, as placing great stress on the one man theory of history. Again, there is nothing wrong with such a viewpoint or rather the more limited form of it, which one must assume that Brown takes. I can, personally, agree that at certain crucial points of world history one man can play an enormous role in facilitating progress, retarding it or simply supporting stasis. Of course, this requires a necessarily value-laden definition of progress but one could substitute the words 'historical movement' for progress to make it more neutral. Those who only see accident in history usually develop amnesia when they look at the Soviet Union, since it so obviously came into being, developed, declined and passed away. Hence Brown's subject is legitimate and he has brought a wealth of evidence to it. The list of people whom he interviewed or consulted is very impressive. It includes most of the influential reformers. There can be no question but that the wealth of detail in the work helps to provide a very useful history of the period. Nor can we doubt the originality of Brown's work for he has written an almost painstaking account of Gorbachev's steps to reform.
Nonetheless, I am left with the uncomfortable feeling that Brown does see Gorbachev as the great man at an important node of world history. I am uncomfortable because I cannot see that Gorbachev was either a great man or even a prime mover in the events during his reign. Brown [318] lays great stress on Gorbachev's ability to change his views and change others' views and hence sees Gorbachev as the source of change. I doubt whether there was any change of ideas taking place, except in name, or whether ideas played much of a role in the changing of the USSR.
Gorbachev's rise to power
Brown's almost touching early life story for Gorbachev is too official to provide the full picture. While all the events he describes are no doubt accurate, they are not enough to explain Gorbachev's rise and rise to power. He portrays a hard-working, intelligent, well-read and bright man who observed reality and wanted to bring policy in line with that reality. He even indicates that the KGB investigated Gorbachev's friendship with Mlynar, the Czech reformer, but they obviously found nothing against him (p. 41). That in itself is strange because the friendship in itself would be known to the secret police and they would have drawn the correct conclusions. Gorbachev meanwhile acquired all the friends in high places he needed simply by being party secretary in Stavropol. Even Andropov is linked to Stavropol. So Gorbachev became a member of the Politburo in due course because he had the luck to be in Stavropol. As a story it is worthy of a Hollywood film but it does not ring true. When Gromyko spoke of Gorbachev's iron teeth, in his congratulatory speech on Gorbachev's accession to the General Secretaryship, he was not making it up. No one reached the highest office in the Soviet Union without two conditions. The first was institutional backing and the second was suitably ruthless personal qualities. Indeed, he showed how ruthless he could be when he dismissed swathes of the old party apparatus when he established himself. Yesterday's men were put on trial for corruption. He could not have behaved differently in his rise to power.
The government of the USSR had three wings: the apparatus of the party, the apparatus of the secret police, and the general staff of the army. Historically rulers needed at least two of these forces to reach and retain power.
When Gorbachev was appointed General Secretary in March 1985 the party apparatus was divided. That was made clear by their earlier nomination of Chernenko instead of Gorbachev, against the wishes of Andropov, as Brown details very well. Various events after March 1985 indicated that he was on probation. Why then did Gorbachev proceed to reforms so easily? The answer lies in the strength of his support both politically and socially. Not only did the KGB back Gorbachev but major sections of the elite supported him. In other words, Gorbachev had the state support needed to govern but more importantly he also had most of the elite with him. He was backed by the administrative elite but even sections of the historically Stalinist elite went over to him.
The reason for his relative strength lay in the decline of the Stalinist system and the alternatives confronting the 6elite. One modern Russian intellectual put it this way: 'The real reason for perestroika 10 years ago was to preserve a system that was breaking down on its own', says Yevgueni Nemets. 'Since then there have really been two layers of change-official change, which has mostly been geared toward preserving the old power centres, and the spontaneous changes that are the result of the old system breaking down and haphazard reforms' ('Russians Raise Their Expectations', Wall St Journal, 9 July 1996).
A system in decline
The point is that the system was in dire straits. The economy was in irrevocable decline. The historical sources of labour had dried up. That meant two things. One was that there were not enough workers coming on stream to man the plants. The second was that the numerous [319] technological and reliability problems could not be solved, however temporarily, with the use of labour. The system was, effectively, in its death throes and the elite knew it. More importantly, the intelligentsia and the working class also knew it, even if they did not express it either clearly or with self-confidence. The results were plain to see for all those with eyes to see.
The intelligentsia had shifted further to the right, moving over to religion, drugs and von Hayek. Sakharov had supported Pinochet 10 years earlier and his view of Pinochet became a more general view of sections of the elite, ultimately culminating in Lebed's well known 1996 election statement that Russia needed a Pinochet. By this time, however, the intelligentsia had found new heroes. The workers were beginning to strike and they could no longer be shot down in the old way.
The market supplanted communism as a heroic goal to which all could aspire. It was a utopia where everyone who worked hard could be as rich as Rockefeller. The workers had no use for the classical market but they too bought the idea that they could control their own product, as well as their own labour process, in an ideal market. That all social groups disliked the social system was axiomatic but that all social groups agreed on one goal, understood totally differently, it is true, the market, was historic. It meant that there was a window of opportunity for the ruling elite, which, if taken, would allow them to shift from one social system to another, without losing their social position.
Brown does not agree that the people were discontented with the system, as opposed to having grievances. It is true that the working class and peasantry were and still are opposed to capitalism. That, however, does not mean and did not mean that people could not distinguish between Stalinism, a term he also uses at one point, and socialism. In other words, the discontent was systemic rather than simply grumbles. Brown sees Gorbachev as correctly diagnosing the problem and providing the correct long-term solution-the social market, in a democratic framework but all from above.
The KGB, as the eyes and ears of the elite, were more aware than anyone of the problems and opportunities presented by the time. They knew the extent and forms of discontent. Indeed, by being incorporated so directly into ruling the society, they became the society and so were subject to similar pressures. As the direct instrument of atomisation, they were in a position to decide whether repression was preferable to more radical measures. In fact, they backed reform first with Andropov and then later with Gorbachev. Brown describes in considerable detail the way in which Ligachev, the critical Stalinist, was instrumental in supporting Gorbachev but puts this down to Gorbachev's earlier friendship with and promotion of the man. The later alliance between Chebrikov, the head of the KGB, and Ligachev, however, was no accident. I wonder whether this tremendous stress on Gorbachev's personal relations can bear the weight placed on it by Brown.
In contrast to my view outlined above, Brown leaves us feeling that Gorbachev single- handedly outwitted the old 'Marxist-Leninists'. Admittedly he cites people testifying to Gorbachev's diligence, erudition and almost brilliance but these qualities could never be enough to defeat the entire apparatus. We are told, however, how even the general secretary's house was bugged, which could only mean that most of the men of government and the ruling elite in general knew what was to come. They did not know the end result and the break-up of the USSR was not foreordained, particularly because the elite itself was divided. In short Gorbachev was an instrument rather than the source of change.
The KGB has numerous references in the index but none of them deal in detail with its role in the Soviet Union. As Andropov designated Gorbachev as his successor and as Andropov was the former head of the KGB and retained its support, it is hard not to come to the conclusion that Gorbachev was the KGB candidate for the General Secretaryship. Yet Brown gives the KGB almost no political role to play. [320]
Indeed one might almost think that there was no social group ruling the society, no privileged social group outside the party apparatus. Instead there were simply a series of economists, politicians and members of the intelligentsia. Some politicians wanted change and others did not. Those that did not were backward and possibly evil men.
Was Gorbachev so stupid that he did not understand the course on which he was set? Brown quotes Shakhnazarov to the effect that Gorbachev was determined to carry out a radical change of the society to its final conclusion and we are told that Gorbachev was a social democrat (p. 102). It is not at all clear what a social democratic programme would look like in any country, let alone Russia. From one quote we are given to understand that Gorbachev wanted a welfare state form of capitalism. As the welfare state and social democracy were in crisis everywhere, this makes Gorbachev rather ill-informed and possibly naive. Furthermore, the effect of a shift to the market could only be one in which unemployment would rise, disparities in income and wealth would worsen and groups such as pensioners, the intelligentsia and women would be worse off. A glance at the West would show that this would be the likely result. In fact, this is what has occurred but it was blindingly obvious to those not already blind.
Marxism-Leninism, new ideas and old ideas
Brown has a different view. He cites three ways of looking at Gorbachev-as someone who learned as he went along; as someone who did not know what he was doing and hence operated under the pressure of events and social groups; and as someone who was able to act more profoundly as he acquired more power (p. 13). Brown makes it clear that he regards the first and last explanations of Gorbachev as correct. The problem with this explanation and indeed with the whole book is that there is an enormous stress on a change in ideas. Gorbachev was different, according to Brown, because he had a 'remarkably open mind' (ibid) and hence could adapt over time. In other words, Ligachev and his predecessors were Marxist-Leninists who could not see reality, unlike Gorbachev.
This is a truly primitive approach, worthy perhaps of the secret services, but in no way realistic. Anyone who knew the old Soviet Union knew that there were no Marxists in the Communist Party. To be a genuine Marxist in the Soviet Union was to court imprisonment and worse. What then was a Marxist-Leninist in the Soviet Union? He was not a Marxist, and surely not a Leninist either, as Lenin remained dedicated to a world socialist revolution to the end of his days and such a revolution meant, for Lenin, the abolition of all forms of privilege. A Marxist-Leninist was then neither a Marxist nor a Leninist but a simple apologist for the status quo, with an occasional critical reference to Stalin's achievements, particularly in building socialism in one country. Indeed Brown comes close to this statement when he speaks of Marxism-Leninism as being those parts of the doctrines of Marx and Lenin which suited the purpose of the party hierarchy but with an added gloss (p. 96). Since very few individuals in the old Soviet Union were uncritical of the status quo we have to conclude that a Marxist- Leninist was simply an accomplished liar, who differed from Western liars in using a large number of quotations from some Marxist writers. The material basis of such people lay in their need to defend the existence of privilege or the so-called nomenklatura.
Gorbachev from this angle was an accomplished liar who knew when to stop lying. He could never have believed in Marxism, Leninism or for that matter socialism, as understood by Marx, Keir Hardie or Sydney Webb.(1) Brown, however, argues that Gorbachev was a Marxist, from the time that he was a student, and cites Mlynar to that effect (pp. 31-32, 119). A genuine Marxist is not distinguished by proclamations but by theoretical analysis and practical action. In those Soviet conditions, to be a Marxist would mean analysing the forms of exploitation and oppression and finding ways of opposing it, even if underground or very deep underground There is no trace in Gorbachev's writings or statements of any understanding of the concept [321] of exploitation. After all, Gorbachev never supported egalitarianism. He explicitly denounced it many times and obstructed the attempts to remove elite privileges in 1989-90. No doubt Brown is right in one respect; Gorbachev was a social democrat, strongly influenced by Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, and indeed still is one.(2) But it is hard to see that Gorbachev changed his viewpoint. He did not need to do so. Gorbachev wanted a form of so-called 'market-socialism and was surprised to discover that it did not work, in spite of his Soviet and Western advisers.
Brown's mechanism for change becomes one of ideological conversion. He argues that the KGB and army made non-evolutionary change remote (pp. 22, 56, 113), and hence we are led to conclude that Gorbachev was a prime instrument in this evolutionary change, complementary indeed to the dissidents like Sakharov (p. 56). Curiously, he points out quite correctly that the Communist Party was not a party but a state structure, to which many people belonged because it was necessary to do so as part of their career. As a result, it had many different viewpoints within it and many different factions from monarchist through nationalists and liberals to a few genuine socialists. Hence he argues, quite rightly, that its disintegration became inevitable once a measure of pluralism was established (p. 22).
The problem is that these different viewpoints had existed for a long time inside the Communist Party, even if their proponents dared not come out openly with their views. The Stalinised Communist Party had been nationalist from the 1920s. It had become increasingly anti-semitic from the 1920s onwards. The market had been resuscitated as a rational path for the Soviet Union first under Stalin, then under Khrushchev and most notably under Kosygin. The intelligentsia was divided between liberals and nationalists. The market, however, had wide support. One might even make the case that if not for the Czech developments in 1967-68, Kosygin might have pressed the timid market reforms, which had just begun, somewhat further. In other words, the ideological conditions for reforms existed for a long time. One could go even further and ask whether the market could not have been introduced by Stalin in 1925-27.
To give Brown some credit, he does mention that reforms were easier in the 1980s because of the relatively high level of education, access to limited information through the radio and TV, and decline in the rate of growth and life expectancy (p. 18). He then, however, lays particular stress on the growth of freedom of expression in private circles made possible when families had their own flats. There is no reference to the KGB or NKVD here. The result in my view exaggerates the freedom of expression possible in the old system and underplays the enormous role of the secret police and other instruments of atomisation in the whole period. Brown goes on to explain in the chapter on economic reform that Gorbachev had an easier time of introducing the reform because the economy was in patent decline, the political context was in his favour, it was the general secretary introducing the reform and he had public opinion in his favour (p. 134).
Brown and his critics
Brown, as mentioned above, advised Margaret Thatcher that Gorbachev was the man to support and wrote papers to that effect (pp. 77-78). This raises the intriguing question of who was promoting whom. Brown, adviser to Thatcher and so to the Conservative Party, supported Gorbachev, whose position was substantially strengthened within the Communist Party as a result. Who, however, advised Brown of Gorbachev's real views? That he wanted to go to the market appeared likely to me and indeed anyone who understood the system, without knowing Gorbachev, since the elite had wanted to do so for a very long time and Gorbachev was more dynamic and typical of the post-war elite. That, however, was not the way Brown derived his conclusion. His view was much more personal, more accurate and clearly derived from intimate discussions with important people within the USSR of the time. We may then speculate that [322] Gorbachev's people impressed on Brown the need to support Gorbachev from the point of view of Western governments. One gets the impression that Brown is arguing against critics to his right who felt that little could change in that system and that only the firm line taken by Reagan and Thatcher ensured that the system fell. Gorbachev from this point of view remained a Communist, as evidenced by his refusal to abandon the word 'socialism'. Such a view, and it is quite a popular view in some circles both in Russia and the West, cannot be seriously entertained. The system was in visible disintegration before Reagan came to the presidency. Brown's reply is different. He argues that the system was too strong to be overthrown and Gorbachev changed it from the inside. In this context, he did so by retaining the word socialism but so redefining it that it came to mean a liberal welfare state capitalist democracy (pp. 118-121).
The economy
He argues, almost as an aside, that the 'command economy' worked (even if inefficiently) as long as repression and the Communist Party and Soviet state retained power. Once these two pillars were removed, 'production fell, hoarding increased and shortages grew' (p. 131). Nothing could successfully exist between Stalinism and the market. Brown is really making two points. Firstly, the system could have gone on if not for Gorbachev's reforms. Secondly, once the reforms were initiated the system began to collapse. It is hard to disagree with the second point, especially as I made it many times myself at the time, but I added the rider that they would not make it to the market either, leaving them in a limbo, and so it has turned out.
When Brown talks of the economy, he speaks of its inefficiency as axiomatic. We have, therefore, no indication of the reasons for that inefficiency. It is assumed as an absolute that the market economy is efficient and hence the USSR was inefficient. While it is undoubtedly true that Stalinism is less efficient than capitalism, judged in terms of the cost and quality of output, that does not answer why it should be so. If the criterion were to be standard of living, then the workers of the Soviet Union clearly had a lower standard of living than any country in Western Europe and one might (and I would) attribute that lower standard of living to the Stalinist system. Nonetheless, an explanation of the failure is needed, which is more than just a statement of the inherent superiority of the market. After all, there are market economies, such as Saudi Arabia, India or Brazil, where the standard of living of much of the population is abysmal partly because of the wide income differentials, as well as other obvious reasons which cannot be discussed here.
Because he has no explicit reason for its inefficiency he can have no reason for its decline, which he refers to in a number of places, most obviously in the economic chapter (pp. 134- 136). In turn, this means that Brown cannot have an explanation for the failure to introduce the reform earlier and its difficulties under Gorbachev and later. His correct perception that there must be either one system or the other does not dispose of the problem.
There were and still are three crucial economic categories which require to be transformed The first is the transformation of the ruble into money. That required that ruble emission be very strictly limited, something not done until April 1995, with highly negative consequences, the budget be balanced and prices reflect costs in the short term and supply and demand in the long term. As these measures require the acceptance of widespread bankruptcy, mass unem- ployment and ever wider income differentials, it is not surprising that no government down to the present has been able to grasp the nettle and act. The second aspect which required change was the transformation of the typical very large Soviet enterprise into smaller competing units. The third was the removal of protection for Soviet enterprises against foreign competition. The end result of the implementation of these conditions for capitalism would be mass [323] unemployment if not mass starvation. The population has revolted against the limited aspects of the market introduced by 1996 by supporting the semi-fascist Communist Party of the Russian Federation or abstaining from supporting any candidate. Indeed El'tsin had to adapt to many of the anti-market demands made by his opposition in order to be reelected. Under these conditions it is not surprising that Gorbachev failed. He had no hope of succeeding. Gorbachev only got 0.5% of the total votes in the first round of the presidential election precisely because he had led the countries of the former USSR into an even worse economic mess than before. The problem, here, is that this result was entirely predictable.
Gorbachev was indecisive because there was no real solution for his dilemma, not because he was inherently indecisive. Brown points out that his replacement of personnel was anything but indecisive. Indeed El'tsin looks similarly indecisive today, moving over time from the monetarists to the protectionists and somewhere in the middle. From this perspective the situation was hopeless.
On the other hand, there is another perspective. The elite wanted to shift the system towards capitalism but realised the difficulty in doing so. Hence one faction preferred not to move for political reasons, and not because they were inherently obstructive. They understood the political consequences better than Gorbachev and feared them. On the other hand, there was another faction, which probably also understood the consequences but did not care as long as they could achieve certain limited results. The first of these was their own extemalisation, i.e. the export of assets under their own name, whether originally their own property or that of the society, abroad. The second was the establishment of title to assets internally, however limited, so establishing inheritance of property. This they have achieved. All factions needed to extend the life of the ruling group, as a ruling group, in order to preserve their own privileges and so control over the economy. Gorbachev served the purposes of all these groups until 1990.
We are left to make our own conclusion, a conclusion radically different from Brown's.
Gorbachev wanted capitalism but did not understand its modem operations and did not
understand its likely impact on Russia. On the other hand, the elite standing behind Gorbachev
knew what they were doing, and they achieved their object, but Gorbachev was cast aside
because he was out of his depth.
IREES, University of Glasgow
HILLEL H. TICKTIN
1) The term 'socialism' can mean anything today. In reality, though, the appeal of socialism lies in its egalitarianism and programme for workers' self-management of the society and its units.
2) Brown quotes Shakhnazarov to the effect that Gorbachev had told him in December 1989 that he was a social democrat (p. 102) and later discusses the influence of Willy Brandt and Felipe Gonzalez (pp. 116-117) and quotes him as saying that he wanted the German welfare state in 1993 (p. 138).
EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1997, 317-350
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